Simon McCarthy-Jones argues that Psychologists must help to develop and protect our right to freedom of thought.
12 February 2025
As psychologists, our mission to unravel the complexities of the human mind carries profound responsibilities. Our insights can promote human dignity, autonomy and support democratic self-government. Yet, these same insights can be misused by those seeking profit and power, enabling new forms of control.
Our profession bears the responsibility of mitigating such risks, especially when they stem from our own discoveries. One particularly powerful way we can meet our responsibilities is through actively contributing to the development of the fundamental human right to freedom of thought. With the United Nations recently revisiting this right after more than 70 years of neglect, we have an unparalleled opportunity to influence its evolution.
Encroaching on the autonomy of the mind
Psychological techniques have long been used to manipulate minds by bypassing rational thought. As far back as the 1920s, Edward Bernays (Sigmund Freud's nephew) and the behaviourist John Watson were leveraging psychological insights to manipulate consumers into buying products, including cigarettes. Modern advertisers use newer research, such as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's work on heuristics, to push people into quick, intuitive buying choices.
Similarly, psychological knowledge is used to shape voting behaviour, impacting both candidate preference and voter turnout (Haenschen, 2023; Zarouali et al., 2022) – as brought to the public consciousness by the Cambridge Analytica fiasco. Such fledgling efforts are likely to be turbo-charged by the power of artificial intelligence (AI). With extensive data on human behaviour in general, potentially aided by individualised profiles, AI can tailor messages precisely to maximise their influence (Matz et al., 2024) with no requirement that this respect or engage our ability to think rationally.
Psychological techniques are also increasingly exposing the once private realm of the mind. Personal stances on a range of issues can be inferred from observable behaviours, such as Facebook likes (Kosinski et al., 2013). As neuroscientific research into inferring or decoding thoughts from neural activity advances (Chen et al., 2024), many foresee a future threat to mental privacy (Ligthart et al., 2022). This work frequently receives significant funding from both tech companies or governmental defence agencies (McCarthy-Jones, 2023).
We are, then, living amidst 'Manhattan Projects' of the mind, which not only threaten to know us better than we know ourselves but also to weaponise this knowledge against us.
Legal developments
In response to these and other threats, there has been a revived interest among legal scholars in the right to freedom of thought. One might assume, as I did, that the law would have already clearly operationalised this right, much like the extensive body of law on the right to freedom of speech. Alas not. Although the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights established a formal right to freedom of thought, there remains a major gap between the frequent praise for this right and the minimal discussion of its specifics. As it stands, freedom of thought is an underdeveloped and largely hollow right.
To address this problem, the United Nations published a landmark report in 2021, putting flesh on the bones of the right to freedom of thought (Shaheed, 2021). This report emphasised that people should not be forced to reveal their thoughts, not be punished for their thoughts, not have their thoughts impermissibly altered, and that governments should foster an enabling environment for thought. Scholars, primarily from the legal profession, are now debating what these proposals mean in practice and how this right should be instantiated.
The role of Psychology
Psychology could potentially leave it up to the legal profession to adjudicate what this right should mean. The judges would decide and the likes of us abide. But it is unimaginable that psychologists have nothing to add to this discussion. Our discipline's expertise is crucial to developing effective ways to protect and promote free thought. Furthermore, this right is likely to have a substantial effect on psychological practice, particularly on mental health treatment (O'Callaghan et al., 2024), meaning we need to get onto this debate at the ground floor.
This is not to suggest that that the legal profession's conception of thought must align perfectly with our understanding as psychologists (Ligthart et al., 2022). Insisting that the law protect our psychological conception of 'thought' would disregard the real-world balancing of interests and concerns that the law must address. However, we should not allow the legal profession to unilaterally determine our role in this process. Some legal scholars argue that 'the role of science' is to 'not to provide us with the basic legal concepts' (Ligthart et al., 2022). While there is merit to this perspective, if the right to freedom of thought is to do what it says on the tin, and protect thought, someone needs to hold Law's feet to the fire. This should be us. No-one puts science in the corner.
So, what can psychology offer, in the spirit of interdisciplinary collaboration (McCarthy-Jones, 2021), to the development of this right? Two obvious places to start are the scope of the right – what should be considered as 'thought'; and the nature of the right – what constitutes a violation.
What is thought?
Psychologists can highlight the diverse ways in which we conceptualise 'thought', helping the legal profession to determine what should fall within the scope of the right to freedom of thought. Generally, the law conceives of thought as something that happens inside our heads, in a 'forum internum'. Conversely, the law considers happenings outside of the head, in the 'forum externum', to be within the realm of speech.
Psychology challenges this neat distinction by viewing thinking as extending beyond the confines of the skull into the external world. The philosopher Joel Walmsley and I have termed this 'forum externum thought' (McCarthy-Jones & Walmsley, 2024). This concept builds on the claim by philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers that 'cognitive processes ain't (all) in the head' (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). According to them, if a process in the external world would be considered thought if it were occurring inside our head, then it qualifies as thought.
Following this reasoning, using a pen and paper to perform calculations constitutes thinking, even though it happens outside our heads. For someone with dementia, a notebook may function as their memory. Writing can also be considered thought, rather than merely an expression of thought. As Carruthers (1998) puts it, in some cases 'the thinking is the writing'. For example, in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, protagonist Winston Smith thinks by undertaking the forbidden act of writing in his diary. Likewise, certain uses of internet search engines or conversations with ChatGPT can arguably be forms of thinking.
Deciding whether to include 'forum externum thought' within the scope of the right to freedom of thought is no mere academic exercise. Unlike the right to freedom of expression, which is a qualified right that can be limited for reasons such as national security or public health, the right to freedom of thought is an absolute right. This means there can never be a justification for interfering with someone's freedom of thought.
If diary writing or certain internet searches, for example, are deemed to be 'thought', they would receive absolute legal protection. Courts could no longer access your diary or elements of your internet search history, which remain would remain permanently sealed to the prying eyes of the state. Thus, the legal definition of 'thought' carries profound practical implications.
Clearly, this doesn't mean that everything people do on the internet can be claimed as 'thought' and hidden from authorities. However, it does mean acknowledging that some of our internet searching is 'thought' and deserves protection as such. Practically, this perspective could push back again legislation, such as Section 3 of the UK Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, whose proscriptions on internet searching led the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy to accuse the UK government of pushing towards 'thought crime' (Zedner, 2021).
Another example of thinking occurring outside our skulls is when we speak with others.
Cognition is socially distributed. Research shows that group problem-solving, such as when tackling the famous 'Linda paradox', can be more effective than individual efforts (Charness et al., 2010). Thought is particularly powerful when groups of individuals with diverse viewpoints come together in a good faith debate to uncover the truth. This shows that thought is not merely an isolated, internal, individual experience, as Rodin's famous statue The Thinker might suggest.
Thought is social, as psychologists such as Lev Vygotsky have long emphasised. Ignoring this aspect would leave much thought unprotected. We should seriously consider how to extend the right to freedom of thought to cover our collaborative thinking together, which we might term 'thoughtspeech' (McCarthy-Jones, 2024), while ensuring this aligns with human dignity and existing hate speech legislation.
This proposal also forces us to consider why thought is currently given absolute legal protection. Is it merely because thoughts in the head are deemed unable to harm others directly, thus warranting complete freedom? This is an argument from impotence. Alternatively, is it because thought is so vital that we do not want to place any limits on it, even if it can cause harm? This is an argument from importance. We need to decide just how committed we are to free thought, acknowledging that opinions will likely vary.
What makes thought free?
Psychology can also elucidate what makes thought-free. A clear conceptual grounding for what makes thought free is essential to for principled identifications of violations of this right.
Psychology can help explain how specific cognitive processes, such as attention, reasoning and reflection, support thought. Sustained and selective attention, for example, is central to reasoned, and hence free thought. This means disruptions by 'attention merchants' (Wu, 2017), who hijack our attention, can be seen as impairing our freedom of thought.
Similarly, pushing individuals into heuristic-based System 1 thought, while deterring slow, deliberative System 2 thought, should also constitute an offence against free thought. Denying opportunities for reflection also encourages heuristic-based thinking. Here psychology can advise on what an 'autonomy-supportive context' (Chatzisarantis et al., 2009) does and does not look like.
We can also examine how people and systems raise barriers to free thinking by increasing the level of courage needed to think freely. US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis emphasised not simply the power of reasoning, but specifically the power of 'free and fearless reasoning'. Courage, said Brandeis, was the secret of liberty.
However, when activists lobby for the termination of a thinker's employment, foolhardiness rather than courage becomes a precondition for free thought. As philosopher Bertrand Russell (1922) saw, 'thought is not free if the profession of certain opinions makes it impossible to earn a living.'
Psychological research into conformity, social influence and trust can help design systems that promote and protect rather than deter free thought. Nevertheless, thought will not be free until employment law recognises and protects employees' right to freedom of thought.
Collectively, I call Attention, Reason, Reflection and Courage the 'ARRC of free thought'. This represents an initial effort to show how psychology can help explain what the key components of thought are, aiding the complex task of determining when mental influence should be deemed impermissible. Recent legislation highlights the urgency of this question.
For example, the EU's recent Digital Services Act states that online platforms shall not 'design, organise or operate their online interfaces in a way that deceives or manipulates the recipients of their service or in a way that otherwise materially distorts or impairs the ability of the recipients of their service to make free and informed decisions'. But what constitutes manipulation?
Legal scholar Jan Christoph Bublitz (2014) emphasises that defining legitimate and illegitimate ways to influence thought will be a crucial societal question in this century. Psychology must help answer this question.
The tools and the duty
In summary, after 70 years of waiting, the right to freedom of thought is finally taking shape. Psychologists must engage in the ongoing discussion about this right's nature and scope to influence its trajectory effectively. We have both the tools and the duty to make a substantive contribution to the legal protection of the human mind. All that remains is for psychologists to step up to the challenge. We may not agree on the answers, but we can certainly agree on the importance of being involved in the search for them.
Dr Simon McCarthy-Jones is an Associate Professor in Clinical Psychology and Neuropsychology in the Department of Psychiatry at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
SOURCE:
https://www.bps.org.uk/psychologist/your-mind-needs-you(accessed 19.2.25)