Wednesday, 20 August 2025

Podcast Asexuality and Trauma




at: https://megjohnandjustin.com/you/asexuality-and-trauma/

This week on the podcast we addressed a listener’s question about how we might go about knowing whether we are on the asexuality spectrum or whether our lack of sexual attraction is due to trauma in our life which perhaps we should address.


In the podcast we unpack a lot of what is meant by both asexuality and trauma, as well as considering the overlaps, and how all of us might address elements of trauma as they surface in our sexual lives.
It’s Fine to be Ace

We started with a few caveats. First there are lots of different ways of being asexual, all of which are absolutely legitimate and valid. Some ace people are neutral about sex, some are averse to it. Some sometimes have forms of solo or partnered sex, many don’t. Some experience romantic attraction, some don’t (aromantic people). Some experience a little attraction (gray-A) or in certain relationships (demisexual). Just as it shouldn’t matter why an allosexual person is allosexual, it shouldn’t really matter whether these diverse asexualities are the result of being ‘born that way’, or choosing asexuality as a response to problematic cultures of sexuality, or life experiences meaning you are asexual. For most of us it’s probably a complex combination of bio, psycho, and social aspects.

Historically asexual people have been treated as if their low – or no – sexual attraction must be a problem, often with the assumption that it’s the result of trauma. The first thing to say is that – as with most marginalised sexual communities – there is no evidence that asexual people are any more likely to have been abused, or to suffer from mental health problems, that anybody else. That’s why asexuality is now clearly stated not to be any kind of ‘psychiatric disorder’ in the psychiatric manuals.
Trauma is so common

Secondly, we could argue that all of our sexualities – or asexualities – have something to do with trauma because (1) sadly high numbers of us experience sexual forms of abuse, assault, and bullying as children and/or adults and (2) the restrictive messages we receive about sexuality are a form of intergenerational trauma. Over the generations sex ed, sex advice, parents, porn, Hollywood movies, magazines, etc. all pass on limited ideas about what counts as sex, and how we should have sex, which leave many people having sex which is painful, unwanted, mediocre, even non-consensual. Many people who are sexual in pretty normative ways are quite dissociated when they have sex and many could be seen as traumatised and retraumatising themselves.

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So it’s not a matter of here’s the ‘normal’ thing – being sexual – which is unrelated to trauma, and here’s the ‘abnormal’ thing – being asexual – which is probably related to trauma. It’s certainly a shame if ace folks feel they have to wonder about trauma in a way that allosexual people don’t, because of all the stigma about being asexual or struggling sexually in any way – even in sex positive spaces.

Also we’d say that ace communities have some of the most vital things to teach everyone about sex because they make it clear that nobody (ever) has to have sex. We can’t really be in consent unless we know that it’s really okay to never do the thing (in this case sex).
Reflecting on trauma

All those caveats aside, of course it can still be important for those of us who are asexual (whether for a period or for the longer term) and have also been through traumatic experience to reflect on whether these things are related. It is possible that they are somewhat related, completely related, or not related at all (you might just happen to be ace, and happen to be traumatised). Again, all of those options are equally valid.

A lot of people’s sexualities are shaped by traumatic things that happen to them. It seems that one major survival strategy in response to trauma is to process things sexually. For some that might mean developing kinks in response to trauma, or using sex as a way to self-soothe, for others it might mean retreating from sexual experience either in some contexts or completely. So a person who is sexually bullied at school might become averse to sex, or identify as asexual, they might develop very gently erotic relationships which feel very different to the bullying, they might eroticise being sexually dominated in a more safe BDSM context, or they might eroticise becoming the dominant – or even bullying – person. All of these responses – and no response – are valid and legit, so long as only acted upon consensually.
Signs of trauma

Here are some signs that trauma might be involved in your a/sexuality. Do you see/hear/experience something sexual and find that you get dissociated (not present, out of your body, unable to remember things)? Do you get reactive – feeling heightened emotions like fear or anger and going into fight, flight, freeze, or fawn responses? Do you have trauma body responses like twitches or shakes? Do you have flashbacks or intrusive memories? Do you end up feeling very overwhelmed? Do you find yourself shutting down or melting down?

If these things happen then it might be useful to get professional help from a trauma-informed therapist using somatic experiencing, EMDR, or other techniques, as well as learning more about trauma and how it works. Trauma-informed sexological body workers may also be particularly helpful in this area.
You don’t have to fix anything

However being traumatised in a certain area of live does not mean that you have to ‘fix’ the trauma and go towards that thing (e.g. trying to have a certain kind of sex or relationships if you become triggered by them). It’s also perfectly legitimate just to decide that that thing isn’t for you. It’s also fine to be in a place of not being ready to address that trauma yet. A vital part of trauma therapy is building a sense of safety and learning when it is good to go towards the trauma – or the feelings accompanying it – and when better to move away from it.

So TLDR: it’s fine to be ace, it’s fine to be traumatised, it’s fine for those things to be linked or not, and it’s useful for all of us to explore our sexuality, and trauma, and how those things may or may not be linked.

What isn’t okay is shame around asexuality and shame around sexual trauma. What also isn’t okay is any form of conversion therapy which tries to make people sexual. If you do seek out a therapist please make sure that no part of their agenda is the assumption that it’d be better if you were sexual: that’s acephobia right there and no major therapeutic body supports it. Remember, it can’t be consensual if it’s not okay not to have sex.

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Newborns may have innate sense of prosocial behaviour


Newborn babies seem able to distinguish between prosocial and non-social behaviour in new study, though questions remain.

15 August 2025

By Emma Young



We are a remarkably cooperative species (at least, on the whole), capable of working together to everybody's benefit. Research into the cognitive and emotional underpinnings of this has pointed to everything from our ability to feel empathy to a fundamental preference for prosocial, rather than anti-social, people.

The fact that these abilities and attitudes are seen across cultures, and that many have been observed in even young babies, has led to the idea that human morality itself may stem (at least in part) from evolved adaptations for sustaining cooperation within large groups, note the authors of a recent paper in Nature Communications.

However, even the youngest babies in these earlier studies had at least three months' experience in the world, write Alessandra Geraci at the University of Catania and colleagues. In a bid to explore whether some of these abilities might really be innate, rather than learned, they recruited groups of healthy newborns, with an average age of just five days.

In the first of three experiments, 36 babies were held on a parent's lap while videos depicting two grey balls were presented side-by-side on a screen. One of the videos was designed to depict 'social approach' — with Ball B moving towards Ball A twice, before ending up close to it. The other video was designed to convey 'social avoidance' — with Ball B moving towards Ball A then backing up, and finishing up further away from it. These videos were positioned and designed in such a way that even newborns, with their limited vision, will have been able to see them.

Half the babies saw a 'social' version of the videos, in which both balls moved, and so appeared to have some agency. In the other, 'non-social' version, though Ball B moved, Ball A did not — making Ball A an inert object, rather than a social agent, the researchers write.

The team monitored which side of the screen the newborns looked at throughout the minute-long display (or until they looked away for at least 10 seconds, suggesting that they had lost interest).

The results showed that in the social condition, newborns spent more time looking at the approach video, rather than avoidance video, suggesting they could tell the difference between the two interactions. In the non-social condition, however, they didn't show any preference.

This experiment provides evidence that newborns can distinguish between an extremely simple form of prosocial versus antisocial interaction, and that they pay more attention to the social one, the team writes.

There is another possible interpretation, however. As Ball B's approach wasn't clearly beneficial to Ball A, it's possible that their attention was drawn because they interpreted the attention as a potential threat.

In a second experiment, the researchers sought to create a more moral context in the videos. This time, 36 newborns saw side-by-side videos that were designed to depict helping vs hindering. In both videos in the 'social' condition, Ball A appeared to try to move up a slope, but failed. In the 'helping' scenario, Ball B then moves from the bottom to 'push' Ball A up the slope. In the 'hindering' condition, Ball B moves down from the top and pushes Ball A to the bottom.
In the non-social condition, Ball A did not move independently — it was stationery until it was 'pushed' either up or down the slope by Ball B.

The team's analysis of the results revealed that newborns in the social condition, but not the non-social condition, looked for longer at the 'helping' than the 'hindering' behaviour.

The third and final experiment was a partial replication of this study. The team weren't able to recruit enough babies to run a full replication, so all 18 newborn participants saw the social version of the helping/hindering videos. Again, the team found that the newborns spent longer looking at the 'helping' rather than the 'hindering' actions.

The researchers conclude that the work marks a clear step forward for research into whether we come into the world able to distinguish between types of social interaction. "These findings go significantly beyond past work in lending support to claims that humans are in possession of unlearned mechanisms for detecting and evaluate (sic) key features of the sociomoral world," they conclude.

There is, however, still some discussion to be had about exactly what the newborns may be interpreting from these videos, and whether it's truly social at all. Another conclusion that could be drawn from the results from the partial replication, in the third experiment, could be that the babies spent longer looking at a video that violated their expectations of what would happen to a ball on a slope, given the force of gravity. (Other research suggests that we are born equipped with some 'intuitive physics'.)

In experiment two, the babies in the non-social condition didn't spend any longer, overall, looking at what might termed the 'anti-gravity' rather than the 'pro-gravity' video. But they spent less time, in total, looking at these videos than the babies in the 'social' condition, and this could have affected the results. (As there were was more going on in the 'social' videos, it's perhaps not surprising that they were more visually engaging.)

Exploring potential social — not to mention moral — judgements in newborns is clearly fraught with difficulty. But future studies will hopefully address some of the other factors that might have influenced the results in these experiments.

Read the paper in full:
Geraci, A., Surian, L., Tina, L. G., & Hamlin, J. K. (2025). Human newborns spontaneously attend to prosocial interactions. Nature Communications, 16(1). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-025-61517-3

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Monday, 11 August 2025

‘Attachment research gave some indication where we could start in trying to parent our seriously unwell daughter’


Robbie Duschinsky (University of Cambridge) reflects on parenting a profoundly unwell and disabled child whilst undertaking research and writing about attachment.

01 August 2025


Ibegan conducting research addressing child-caregiver attachment relationships in 2012. A few years later, things settled down for my wife Sophie and I in our jobs, and we felt it was time to start a family. I felt positive about becoming a dad, and reassured by what I had learnt from attachment theory and research. I understood about the importance of being available to offer support for a child when they wanted to explore (a 'secure base'); and to offer them help and comfort when they were distressed (a 'safe haven'). This is what attachment researchers called a 'secure attachment'. I doubted I'd be anything like a perfect parent, but that did not seem to be especially the point. Someone my child could trust – I thought that sounded possible.

The next few years were hard. Sophie and I celebrated the start of three pregnancies, only for each to end in miscarriage. Miscarriage is not so uncommon, and I remained hopeful, though these losses weighed on both of us.

In 2019, following a fourth pregnancy, our daughter A was born. However, it soon became clear that she was seriously unwell. We received news of our daughter's diagnosis of a very rare and serious genetic condition over the phone the day that lockdown began. The severity of the condition can vary. For A it has meant profound intellectual disability, long-term struggles with nutrition, and impairments in communication and mobility. Most immediately, she was in pain 16-20 hours a day for her first few years. Coinciding with the pandemic, lockdowns and huge healthcare backlogs, Sophie and I were largely on our own with our sick daughter, with limited access to help.

In 2021, A began having seizures, which did not respond well to medication, and since that time she has needed continuous monitoring day and night. At that time, she lost the ability to vocalise, eat, drink, walk, play with toys, smile, or even routinely recognise us. Now, heading towards her sixth birthday, some of these skills have returned, such as her smile and increasingly her ability to recognise us. Many skills remain partially or wholly lost.

Through A's early years, and still today to an extent, I faced a daily battle with feelings of hopelessness and heartbreak. In this context, something that made a profound difference was my work on attachment theory and research. Thinking about, researching and writing about attachment helped me retain a sense that whilst the situation could feel impossible, it did not mean that it actually was impossible. Sophie and I couldn't stop A being ill. But attachment research gave some indications of where we could start in trying to parent our daughter.

A lot of well-meaning nonsense and hazy generalities are circulated about attachment. Inaccurate information is so much easier to come by than accurate information – it's wild. But attachment theory and research has also generated some recommendations for parents, supported by researcher consensus as well as experimental evidence from attachment-based interventions. My experiences have given me an urgent sense of the value of some of these key messages. I have tried to make these accessible in my books, and especially in one for students and general readers called The Psychology of Attachment, written with my friends and colleagues Pehr Granqvist and Tommie Forslund.

The challenges A faced were extreme and rare. But the recommendations of attachment theory and research still had bearing for Sophie and I, maybe even more so given our daughter's suffering and need for comfort. The focus of this article is on the ideas I found helpful in giving some sense of how to proceed with A's care. I close by bringing the reader up to the present, thinking about what I have learnt from these experiences, and how these lessons have shaped me as a parent to A's little sister, as a co-parent with my wife Sophie, and also as a researcher.
Providing a safe haven

An early and important source of help for Sophie and I as parents was the idea of the caregiver as a 'safe haven'. By this attachment researchers mean that when a child is distressed, they are disposed to seek a familiar caregiver with the expectation of help and protection. Touch and comfort from a familiar adult, these basic things, help an infant to re-find equilibrium. Older children can get the same reassurance by other indications of the caregiver's availability. Even as adults we are still disposed to look for comfort when we are distressed, unless we have learnt that this will backfire.

In being available when a child is distressed, a caregiver gradually helps the child learn to trust, and to cope with difficult feelings (Ainsworth, 1985). The extent of security of each close relationship makes an additional contribution to a child's development in these regards, highlighting the importance of caregivers supporting one another in their provision of safe haven availability to a child (Dagan et al., 2021).

Sophie and I could not protect our daughter from pain. However, we could remain with her through it, holding her, and walking her up and down our little flat for unending hours. We could reassure her that she was not alone. We could try to teach her the expectation that when she was distressed, her mum or I would be completely there with her, even if, to our sorrow, we didn't know how to make things better. We could try to support one another with the grief we were feeling.

Attachment theory suggests that caregivers are most readily able to offer a safe haven to their child when they feel themselves supported by their family, community and society (Supkoff et al., 2013). Due to the pandemic and the severity of A's illness, at times we have felt quite abandoned by community and society, with exceptions. We have found it tremendously difficult to access support from health and social care services, who have often been hell-bent on reducing costs or trying to pass responsibility to other services regardless of what this means for A's safety or our family's ability to cope. Some professionals have gone above and beyond to help us. There's been almost no middle ground. Likewise many friends from before we became parents ran in horror at A's suffering and what our lives looked like. But some friends really stepped up to try to look after us, acting towards A like extended family. And since 2024 A has started attending a specialist primary school, which she absolutely loves, and which has reduced pressure on us too.
Attending to our child's signals

Attachment research has a premise that a lot goes on at the level of behaviour that mostly does not get noticed. On this basis, a second recommendation made by the attachment literature was the idea that caregivers can consider their child's actions as having 'signal value' for their experiences and needs (Ainsworth, 1977). The caregiver can be on the look-out for behaviours and vocalisations that might give relevant clues. This will allow the caregiver to accurately identify the child's motivations, and respond to them appropriately and in a timely way. For instance, being able to distinguish signals of tiredness from hunger or pain can be helpful in ensuring that the caregiver is available as a safe haven when needed.

It was very hard to discern A's experiences and needs. For her first years, other signals were often drowned out by pain. Then, with the seizures, she lost much of what capacity she had to communicate her experiences and needs. At times it felt that A was inaccessible to us, for all that she was physically present and required care.

Yet the idea of the child's actions as having 'signal value' suggested that signal might still be found, even if most of A's means of communicating her experiences and needs had been overloaded, blocked or damaged. We began keeping a moment-to-moment diary of everything we thought might have signal value, day and night: what A seemed to pay attention to, when she was capable of attention; bowel movements; coughs; when she fell asleep and woke up; changes in her breathing. Sophie and I worked together to try to interpret these signals.

This level of attention was, and remains, costly. It is exhausting, and comes at the expense of other things. But over time it has helped build our understanding of A's experiences and needs, allowing us to respond to them. We searched for A in these small signals, and in this way, over time, began to identify critical factors for her care, including triggers for pain and for seizures, and other indicators associated with better days for her. We discovered, for instance, that she loved cheesy '90s pop music (e.g. Spice Girls, Aqua), and given the lack of access to medical care, this was what we had available as pain relief for A for her early years.

Sophie and I feel that A acts like someone who believes that we are trying to interpret her signals and to help. On her better days she reaches out for contact, she smiles, and she rarely resists her medical care; she readily forms new relationships with people who are responsive to her cues. A knows we are listening out for her signals; and Sophie and I know that A's signals can be found and trusted. Despite all that we have to bridge in order to achieve this understanding, this sense of mutual trust makes a huge practical and emotional difference to every day of interaction and care.
Avoidance and Emotional Defence

A third point raised by attachment theory and research is that a child's signals of their experiences and needs can be obstructed by the caregiver's own defences (Main & Hesse, 1992), or when a caregiver feels chronically overwhelmed (Cyr et al., 2010). So when a child signals to us, our defences or feelings of overwhelm can hinder us from recognising or responding to these signals.

Attachment theory is sometimes perceived as about categories, putting people into boxes. That's a stereotype and simplification. In reality, we all have tendencies towards particular kinds of defence or dysregulation, tendencies that will be elicited particularly when we are under stress, and shaped and reshaped by the training our life continues to give us in how to cope. Parents, including those of children with additional needs, have our own histories. For me, A's additional needs have confronted me with the limits of my defences, not least from watching them buckle at times from the pressure placed on them.

A's quality of life is frequently not good. But with the passing years it has been generally getting better, and when she is not in pain or dazed by seizures she is a remarkably happy and resilient little person. Even so, perhaps the hardest challenge for me as a parent, my most pervasive defence, has been to bear to try to see things from A's point of view. Whilst able to cognitively attend minutely to signals of her experience and needs, I nonetheless find it aversive to imagine what A's life might be like for her. To go beyond A's signals and what they mean for what I need to do, and try to fully imagine her mind behind those signals.

Attachment theory and research teaches that avoidance is a strategy, one that can be protective when the alternative would be getting overwhelmed and dysregulated. It isn't bad. But avoidant behaviour by carers is penalised by the contemporary health and social care system: our experience has been that unless you are telling professionals repeatedly that you are not coping, help gets stripped away, even when this is manifestly unsafe. Additionally, attachment research regards avoidance as emotionally impoverishing when it is stuck in place. When we barricade ourselves off from the experience of others, this can help us cope, but also risks leaving us feeling empty (Slade et al., 2023).

Over the years I've given this challenge a lot of thought; I've talked about it with Sophie; I've had counselling through our local children's hospice. Though it is hard, I am learning how to use avoidance more flexibly, and try, where I can, to feel out what A's experience might be. The more I do, the more pleasure and pain I receive in being A's parent. As I do, the more A seems to respond to me and engage, even if her forms of engagement remain limited. This would be in line with the idea from attachment theory that exploration is facilitated when a child feels their caregiver's engagement with their experiences (Fonagy & Target, 1997).
The present

In 2022, Sophie and I had another little girl, L, who has been healthy and hilarious. The weight of past experience and day-to-day pressures of A's care has certainly affected me as a parent. As someone who generally thought of himself as quite silly, I can at times barely recognise myself in my parenting behaviour, which can sometimes be flat and exhausted, lacking playfulness.

I struggle especially with the rough play L enjoys, and requests most days: even faced with our firework of a toddler, my hands expect A's vulnerability, and it requires intense concentration to adjust. But Sophie and I also have an intensified sense of the preciousness of L's communications, and confidence in our capacity for teamwork as parents.

I continue to try to learn from attachment theory and research to inform me as a parent. Indeed, I sometimes talk in my head to the attachment researchers I have read or know about my caregiving responsibilities for A; I find this can help with making sense of it all.

In turn, my experiences as a parent have shaped how I have interpreted and undertaken attachment theory and research, and informed my writing about the topic. This has included a sense of wonder at the power of some of the levers available to caregivers: touch, noticing signals, provision of a secure base. I've also gained greater tenderness in considering the challenges caregivers may face in thinking about the mind of their child.

Experiences as A's parent have also given me additional questions. For instance, whereas attachment researchers generally treat 'safe haven availability' as a single thing, I've been brought to think about its different aspects, such as a caregiver's response to indications of pain, distress, fear and incomprehension. I have also become more critical of the limited way that attachment theory and research have addressed the wider context of family life, even when the data was available to do so. I cannot unlearn what I have learnt as a parent about the power of social isolation and failures of health and social care systems, and this has left a decisive mark on me as a researcher.

In Cornerstones of Attachment Research, written before A was born, I wrote of a sense of affection for attachment theory and its 'genuine insights into the strange, drunk-dialling human heart'. For all that I am more critical of attachment theory and research now, I couldn't have possibly known then how precious some of those insights would prove to me when I became a parent.Dr Robbie Duschinsky is Professor of Social Science and Health and Head of the Applied Social Science Group within the Primary Care Unit.
See also our 'parenting' collection.
Key sources and further reading

Ainsworth, M.D.S. (1977) Social development in the first year of life: Maternal influences on infant-mother attachment. In: J. M. Tanner (Ed.) Developments in Psychiatric Research (pp.1-20). London: Hodder & Stoughton

Ainsworth, M. D. (1985). Attachments across the life span. Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, 61(9), 792-812; Goldberg, S. (2000) Attachment and Development, London: Routledge.

Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & van IJzendoorn, M. H. (2025). Attachment in pediatrics: No such thing as a child. In M. H. Bornstein & P. E. Shah (Eds.), APA Handbook of Pediatric Psychology, Developmental-Behavioral Pediatrics, and Developmental Science (pp. 205–226). American Psychological Association.

Cyr, C., Euser, E. M., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & Van IJzendoorn, M. H. (2010). Attachment security and disorganization in maltreating and high-risk families: A series of meta-analyses. Development & Psychopathology, 22(1), 87-108.

Dagan, O., Schuengel, C., Verhage, M. L., et al. (2021). Configurations of mother‐child and father‐child attachment as predictors of internalizing and externalizing behavioral problems: An individual participant data (IPD) meta‐analysis. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 2021(180), 67-94.

Doodeman, T. W., Schuengel, C., & Sterkenburg, P. S. (2023). Effects of the Attune & Stimulate‐checklist for caregivers of people with severe and profound intellectual disabilities: A randomised controlled trial. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 36(5), 1136-1149

Dozier, M., & Bernard, K. (2019). Coaching Parents of Vulnerable Infants: The attachment and biobehavioral catch-up approach. New York: Guilford Publications

Duschinsky, R. (2020) Cornerstones of Attachment Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press – free to download from the Oxford University Press website

Duschinsky, R., Granqvist, P., & Forslund, T. (2023). The Psychology of Attachment. London: Routledge.

Duschinsky, R. (2025) Developments in Attachment Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press – free to download from the Oxford University Press website

Fonagy, P. & Target, M. (1997). Attachment and reflective function: Their role in self-organization. Development and psychopathology, 9(4), 679-700

Foster, S.L., Schofield, G., Geoghegan, L., Hood, R., Sagi-Schwartz, A … Duschinsky, R. (2025) Attachment theory and research: What should be on the core curriculum for child and family social workers?. Social Work Education, forthcoming.

Main, M. & Hesse, E. ([1992] 2021). Disorganized/disoriented infant behaviour in the Strange Situation, lapses in the monitoring of reasoning and discourse during the parent's Adult Attachment Interview, and dissociative states. In Tommie Forslund & Robbie Duschinsky (Eds.) Attachment Theory and Research: A Reader (pp.108-132), NY: Wiley.

Mucha, L. (2025). Please Find Attached: How Attachment Theory Explains Our Relationships, London: Bloomsbury

Schuengel, C., & Oosterman, M. (2019). Parenting self-efficacy. In Bornstein M. H. (Ed.), Handbook of parenting: Being and becoming a parent (654–680). London: Routledge

Slade, A (2009). Mentalizing the unmentalizable: Parenting children on the spectrum. Journal of Infant, Child, and Adolescent Psychotherapy, 8(1), 7-21.

Slade, A, Sadler, L. S., Eaves, T., & Webb, D. L. (2023). Enhancing attachment and reflective parenting in clinical practice. Guilford Publications.

Supkoff, L., Puig, J., & Sroufe, L.A (2013). Situating resilience in developmental context. In M. Ungar, The Social Ecology of Resilience. (pp. 127-142). New York: Springer

Berástegui, A, & Pitillas, C. (2024). The family keyworker as a critical element for attachment resilience in the face of adversity. Journal of Family Theory & Review, 16(1), 106-123.

Vandesande, S., Bosmans, G., & Maes, B. (2019). Can I be your safe haven and secure base? A parental perspective on parent-child attachment in young children with a severe or profound intellectual disability. Research in developmental disabilities, 93, 103452.

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Friday, 8 August 2025

New study aims to capture the reality of life with chronic illness


The newly-developed Traumatic Chronic Illness Survival model leans away from traditional ‘transformation’ narratives, illustrating the complex experiences of chronic illness.

28 July 2025

By Emily Reynolds

Inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) is a chronic condition affecting millions of people worldwide, including over half a million in the UK. While, as the name implies, it primarily affects the gut, its impact reaches far beyond the digestive system. Growing evidence shows that IBD can be traumatic, impacting the identity, wellbeing, and everyday life of those with the condition.

Writing in the British Journal of Health Psychology, the University of Nottingham's Rachel Murphy and Belinda Harris look at the experiences of women living with IBD, looking closely at the impact of the condition on their sense of self. They develop a new model of the psychological impacts of chronic, fluctuating illnesses that, rather than focusing on a linear journey of 'growth' due to illness (as previous models have tended to do), attempts to more fully acknowledge the "multitude of ways people survive in the face of such devastating conditions."

The study used an Interpretive Phenomenological Approach (IPA) to explore the experiences of women in the UK diagnosed with IBD. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 21 women with a diagnosis of IBD, using flexible questions to encourage deep reflection on identity, gender, healthcare, and emotion. From here, the team pulled out four themes: 'wearing the straitjacket of illness', 'psychologically difficult emotions', 'flexibility of self', and 'navigating a way through'.

Firstly, participants described living with IBD as wearing a metaphorical straitjacket: a constraint that tightened or loosened depending on the severity of symptoms. Trauma was compounded by ongoing physical limitations, feelings of difference, and societal misunderstanding, and the participants reported a profound sense of loss, isolation, and shame in relation to stigmatised symptoms, such as incontinence, fatigue, and the presence of a stoma. These challenges continually affected their sense of identity, sexuality, and ability to be spontaneous.

The next theme looked at psychologically difficult emotions, many of which mirrored the symptoms of post-traumatic stress: denial, defensiveness, and emotional concealment, leading to a painful sense of disconnection between how they felt and how they presented to the world. Several core emotions emerged: shame, despair, self-doubt, and anger. Shame was the most pervasive, while anger, though not often openly expressed, surfaced as frustration over a loss of identity and control.

Next, participants highlighted the importance of developing a flexible sense of self: not always easy to achieve, but possible through drawing on existing traits and developing coping mechanisms over time. Here, resilience was not about thriving, but surviving: pragmatically adjusting to their new normal and learning to accept unpredictability. Acceptance of IBD as part of one's identity, rather than something separate or shameful, also emerged as a cornerstone of wellbeing.

Finally, some found ways to navigate life with IBD by embracing creativity and self-care. This looked like reframing illness, developing routines to avoid flare-ups, and finding pride in things which assist them on their health journeys, such as stoma bags. However, this wasn't universal — only half of participants saw change in this area across their journey with the illness. Others saw less change, and continued to struggle with comparison, guilt, unmanaged symptoms, and a profound lack of psychological support. This left some feeling stuck.

Drawing on their findings, the authors critique traditional healthcare models for failing to capture the complex, ongoing, bodily trauma experienced by women with IBD. Instead, they propose a more nuanced framework: Traumatic Chronic Illness Survival (TCIS), which better captures the layered, often traumatic realities of living with the condition..

In order for clinicians and allies to provide true support, the team argues, our ideas about living with IBD need to recognise the complexity of the experience, and reject more simplistic or linear expectations of growth and transformation. As such, TCIS centres survival, not transformation, as the primary achievement in chronic illness, and reflects the toll taken by the recurring nature of illness-related trauma. As the team writes, TCIS does not align "with the view that suffering is a necessary path to growth; pain and anguish are the unfortunate effects of a devastating illness."

The team hopes that this work will help clinicians and allies see survival itself as an end of its own, meeting those with IBD (and indeed other chronic, fluctuating illnesses) with compassion, flexibility, and care, with no expectations of what 'recovery' looks like or what psychological experiences might emerge from someone's pain.

Read the paper in full:
Murphy, R., & Harris, B. (2025). Can current post‐traumatic growth models capture the lived experience of life with a fluctuating chronic illness? Towards a new model. British Journal of Health Psychology, 30(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/bjhp.70003


SOURCE:

Wednesday, 6 August 2025

«Η επιστολή που θα ήθελα να διαβάσει ο γιος μου, που μεγαλώνει πολύ γρήγορα»



by Childit.gr
5 Αυγούστου 2025



Ιδιαίτερα οι «αγορομάνες» μπορεί να ταυτιστείτε με το κείμενο της Αμερικανίδας αρθρογράφου Christine Organ.


Δεν ξέρω πότε συνέβη, αλλά έγινε. Ήταν εύκολο να μου διαφύγει, γιατί δεν συνέβη απότομα, αλλά σιγά σιγά. Κάποιες φορές, όταν σε κοιτάω, μπορώ ακόμα να διακρίνω εκείνο το μικρό αγόρι με τα αμυγδαλωτά μάτια και πασαλειμμένη σοκολάτα στο πρόσωπό του, τόσο καθαρά που σοκάρομαι να ακούω τη σχεδόν αντρική, πλέον, φωνή που βγαίνει από το στόμα σου. Ποιος είναι αυτός ο άνθρωπος; Πού πήγε το μικρό μου αγόρι; Υποθέτω ότι είναι κάπου εδώ.


Μεγαλώνεις και απομακρύνεσαι από εμένα εδώ και πολλά χρόνια. Από τότε που γεννήθηκες, υποθέτω. Οι αλλαγές ήταν ανέκαθεν τόσο λεπτές, που πέρασαν απαρατήρητες για μεγάλο χρονικό διάστημα μέχρι που μια μέρα, με χτύπησε κατάμουτρα η συνειδητοποίηση ότι το μικρό μου αγόρι δεν είναι πλέον ένα μικρό αγόρι. Γίνεται άντρας. Έτσι θα έπρεπε να συμβεί, φυσικά, αλλά αυτό δεν κάνει τα πράγματα περισσότερο εύκολα για μένα.

Μεγαλώνοντας αποκτάς κάποια αυτοπεποίθηση και αυταρέσκεια, αλλά ελπίζω να καταλαβαίνεις ότι δεν πειράζει πού και πού να μην έχεις ιδέα τι πρέπει να κάνεις. Γιατί σε αυτό το ταξίδι, όλοι προχωράμε ψηλαφώντας. Έχω ζήσει πολλές δεκαετίες σε αυτό τον πλανήτη, παρ’ όλα αυτά κάποιες φορές εξακολουθώ να νιώθω σαν μικρό, τρομαγμένο κοριτσάκι ή αμήχανη έφηβη. Δεν πειράζει. Ζήτησε βοήθεια, εμπιστεύσου το ένστικτό σου και θα τη βρεις την άκρη.


Αλλά υπάρχουν και κάποια άλλα πράγματα που ελπίζω να ξέρεις μέχρι τώρα…

Ελπίζω να καταφέραμε με τον μπαμπά σου ότι η φράση «να είσαι άντρας» δεν έχει νόημα. Αγνόησέ την. Δεν υπάρχει κανένα πρόβλημα όταν κλαις και δεν πρέπει να φοβάσαι να ζητήσεις συγγνώμη. Μπορείς να είσαι ευαίσθητος και δυνατός μαζί, θαρραλέος και ταυτόχρονα ευγενικός.

Άνοιξε τις πόρτες για να περάσει πρώτη μια γυναίκα –ή ένας άντρας– και περίμενε να μπουν πρώτα οι άλλοι στο ασανσέρ. Όχι για να είσαι τζέντλεμαν με την παραδοσιακή έννοια, αλλά για να είσαι ευγενικός και γενναιόδωρος. Να έχεις, απλά, καλούς τρόπους. Για τον ίδιο λόγο, σπρώξε την καρέκλα σου κάτω από το γραφείο όταν φεύγεις, κατέβασε το καπάκι της τουαλέτας, βάλε τις κάλτσες σου στα άπλυτα.

Άφησε πάντα ένα μέρος σε καλύτερη κατάσταση από ό,τι το βρήκες.


Όταν βρεις κάποιον να αγαπήσεις, μην παίζεις παιχνίδια μαζί του. Να είσαι ανοιχτός και ειλικρινής. Να είσαι ο εαυτός σου. Άφησε εκείνο το πρόσωπο να μπει στην καρδιά σου, ακόμα και αν αυτό σημαίνει ότι ρισκάρεις να πληγωθείς.

Μην κάνεις σεξ αν δεν είσαι προετοιμασμένος να αντιμετωπίσεις ό,τι θα ακολουθήσει μετά. Γιατί υπάρχει πάντα το «μετά». Και τώρα που μιλάμε για σεξ, το «όχι» σημαίνει «όχι». Η σιωπή επίσης σημαίνει «όχι». Ακόμα και το «ίσως» σημαίνει «όχι». Μόνο το «ναι» σημαίνει «ναι» (και σταμάτα να με κοιτάς με αυτό το βλέμμα. Ναι, η μαμά σού μιλάει για το σεξ).

Ο κόσμος είναι γεμάτος με καθοίκια. Όπως και με πολλούς υπέροχος και εκπληκτικούς ανθρώπους, αλλά δυστυχώς και με ένα πλήθος από καθοίκια. Δεν αρκεί εσύ να μην είσαι καθοίκι. Πρέπει να είσαι αρκετά θαρραλέος και ευγενικός για να τους αντισταθείς. Να υπερασπιστείς τον εαυτό σου και τους άλλους, ακόμα και ο σκοπός για τον οποίο αγωνίζεσαι δεν σε επηρεάζει άμεσα. Να αγωνιστείς ούτως ή άλλως, γιατί αυτό είναι το σωστό πράγμα που πρέπει να κάνεις, και η σιωπή ωφελεί μόνο τα καθοίκια.

Να αφήσεις να σε περιβάλλουν άνθρωποι που σε εμπνέουν να είσαι ο καλύτερος εαυτός σου.

Ακόμα και αν ο κόσμος προσπαθήσει να σου πει ότι οι άντρες δεν είναι σε θέση να κάνουν τα ψώνια του σπιτιού, να στρώσουν το κρεβάτι και να φροντίσουν ένα μωρό, όλα αυτά δεν ισχύουν. Είσαι έξυπνος. Είσαι ικανός. Τακτοποίησε τα του σπιτιού σου (κυριολεκτικά και μεταφορικά).




Μην ντρέπεσαι για αυτό που είσαι, ταυτόχρονα όμως μην πάρεις ούτε για ένα δευτερόλεπτο ως δεδομένα τα προνόμια που σου έχουν δοθεί λόγω του φύλου, της εκπαίδευσης, της φυλής, της κουλτούρας ή της κοινωνικοοικονομικής θέσης σου. Χρησιμοποίησε τα προνόμιά σου για να βοηθήσεις εκείνους που τα έχουν στερηθεί.

Ο αδερφός σου είναι ο καλύτερός σου φίλος, ανήκετε στην ίδια ομάδα. Ακόμα και αν έχετε διαφορές μεταξύ σας και αν συνεχίζετε να σπάτε ο ένας τα νεύρα του άλλου κάθε τόσο, είστε οι δύο όψεις του ίδιου νομίσματος. Είστε ένα. Εξάλλου, ποιος άλλος θα σε καταλάβει όταν θέλεις να παραπονεθείς για τους τρελούς γονείς σου;

Και όταν όλα τα άλλα αποτύχουν, κάνε μαγικά. Χάρισε χαμόγελα στους άλλους. Κάνε τον κόσμο ένα καλύτερο μέρος.

Με αγάπη,

Η μαμά σου

Υ.Γ. Και μην ξεχνάς να τηλεφωνείς στη μαμά και τον μπαμπά!


ΠΗΓΗ:

Friday, 1 August 2025

What if they were ours?



Aneeza Pervez on moral failure and the lives of Palestinian children.

25 July 2025


For the past seven years, my research has focused on how children learn to care for others, build friendships, and make sense of fairness in school. I've spent hours listening to children talk about what it means to help someone, what kindness feels like, and why it matters to include others. In classrooms across the UK, I've seen how belonging is fostered through ordinary acts of noticing, sharing, apologising, and defending peers. These are the spaces where childhood is meant to be protected.

As the war in Gaza unfolds, that belief becomes harder to hold. The same children I study in one part of the world, navigating friendship groups and classroom rules, are, in another, being pulled from the rubble. School buildings have become mass graves. Homes, hospitals, and playgrounds have been flattened. Gaza's children are not being protected. They are facing 'unimaginable horrors' (UNICEF, 2025; WHO, 2024).

This contrast is not only unbearable, but also professionally and ethically indefensible. Safeguarding is central to both psychology and education (British Psychological Society [BPS], 2018; United Nations, 1989). But what happens when our institutions fall silent in the face of mass child death? What does it reveal about whose lives are valued, whose grief is legitimised, and whose suffering is too politically inconvenient to name?

This article is not only about Gaza. It is about us. I ask what it means for psychologists to claim a commitment to children's welfare while avoiding the realities of a crisis that has already killed or injured more than 50,000 children. If safeguarding is more than a slogan, we must act like it. The loss of childhood in Gaza is not just a humanitarian tragedy. It is a test of our professional integrity.
Who counts as a child? The ethics of selective empathy

The idea that childhood is a protected and universal category underpins much of psychological theory, safeguarding practice, and international law. Yet the destruction in Gaza reveals just how conditional that notion can be. Over 14,000 Palestinian children have been killed in less than a year, many in their homes, schools, or hospital beds (UNICEF, 2025). Some died clutching siblings. Others were found buried beneath collapsed buildings. Thousands have been orphaned or wounded with no surviving relatives. So common is this reality that medical teams in Gaza have introduced a new designation: WCNSF, wounded child, no surviving family (UNICEF, 2025b; WHO, 2024).

These are not collateral tragedies of war. They are the result of deliberate attacks on the conditions required for childhood to exist. According to Save the Children (2024), more than 90 per cent of Gaza's school buildings have been damaged or destroyed. Clean water, food, shelter, and medical care have been systematically targeted. The World Health Organization confirmed that every paediatric hospital in northern Gaza has been rendered non-functional (WHO, 2024). Children are dying not only from airstrikes, but from sepsis, dehydration, and starvation.

None of this is hidden. UN agencies, humanitarian organisations, and medical professionals have documented the scale of harm in real time. Yet professional communities within psychology and education have largely failed to respond. The question is not whether psychologists have seen the images or read the reports. The question is: what constructions of childhood have allowed us to witness this scale of destruction and still do nothing?

As scholars like Burman (2020) and Nsamenang and Lo-Oh (2010) have shown, developmental psychology often universalises Euro-American norms and sidelines the social, political, and racialised conditions in which childhood unfolds. These omissions are not minor. They shape who is seen as a child, whose suffering is recognised, and whose death is rendered intelligible. Butler's (2009) notion of 'ungrievable lives' is helpful here: public grief is not neutral, but politically organised. In Gaza, we are witnessing what happens when an entire population of children is denied not only protection, but recognition.

Children themselves are often attuned to these inequalities. In my own research, children talked about moral dilemmas with surprising nuance, questioning who gets left out, who gets blamed, and what it means to help someone even when it's risky (Pervez & Galea, 2024). Their accounts of empathy were relational and ethical, not sentimental. That clarity throws adult frameworks into sharp relief. If we claim to understand children, then the lives of Palestinian children must matter to us, not in theory, not eventually, but now, while they are being erased.
When frameworks fracture: The silence of Psychology

What does it mean when a profession built on the principles of safeguarding, trauma-informed care, and developmental protection meets the mass death of children with ambiguity or silence?

The psychological consequences of war on children are well established. Chronic exposure to violence is linked to post-traumatic stress, disrupted attachment, and long-term cognitive, emotional, and relational harm (Barber, 2009; Qouta et al., 2008). Gaza is no exception. But unlike previous conflicts, this war has unfolded in full view of the international community. First-hand accounts from UN agencies, paediatricians, and humanitarian workers have been published in real time. Ignorance is not the problem. Inaction is.

The British Psychological Society's public statements have been cautious, generalised, and politically neutral, calling for 'peace' and 'mental health support' while avoiding any reference to the conditions driving mass child death (BPS, 2023). The American Psychological Association issued a formal call for ceasefire only after sustained pressure from members, and even then, its statement was criticised for its vagueness and lack of moral clarity (APA, 2024; Eidelson, 2024).

This is not merely an issue of delay. It is a crisis of ethical coherence. Psychological bodies routinely affirm that children's welfare is paramount, that safeguarding is non-negotiable, and that professionals must attend to the structural conditions that perpetuate trauma and exclusion. These commitments are embedded in clinical guidelines, professional standards, and training frameworks across the field. Why, then, are they applied so inconsistently, mobilised for some crises, yet absent in others, such as Gaza?

In recent history, children have faced devastating violence in Sudan, Haiti, Yemen, Congo, Afghanistan, Israel, and beyond, often amid institutional collapse, armed conflict, or international neglect. No child's life is more grievable than another. This is not about taking sides. Gaza stands apart, not only because of the staggering scale of harm, but because speaking plainly about that harm has become so difficult. The fear of being seen as taking sides has silenced even the most basic truth: children are being killed and need protection. And that is what sets this crisis apart. When safeguarding depends on the political acceptability of the victim, it ceases to be a framework for protection. It becomes a tool of moral evasion: reliable when safe, withheld when contested.

Part of the answer lies in what I have described elsewhere as institutional complicity through epistemic omission (Pervez, 2025). When psychology as a profession fails to respond to mass atrocities, it does not remain neutral. It tacitly affirms which forms of harm are deemed legitimate, which crises disrupt professional practice, and which do not. It teaches us, implicitly and explicitly, that some suffering is too political to name.

This has consequences. If our safeguarding frameworks are only operational when harm is deemed non-political, then they are not safeguarding frameworks at all. They are tools of moral selectivity that erode public trust and hollow out our credibility. As psychologists, we cannot credibly champion trauma-informed practice while excusing institutional silence in the face of mass trauma.

Silence is also pedagogical. It teaches students, supervisees, and clients that some lives fall outside the boundaries of care. It models a form of moral risk-aversion that rewards neutrality over responsibility. And it undermines the ethical codes we claim to uphold, not because we disagree with them, but because we apply them selectively, in ways shaped by political convenience rather than moral urgency.

We all know that psychology cannot be apolitical. But when the stakes involve the systematic destruction of a civilian population, nearly half of whom are children, professional neutrality is not only inadequate. It is complicit.
The cost of selective morality: What are we teaching the next generation?

When educational and psychological frameworks respond selectively to harm, that selectivity does not go unnoticed by children and young people. They see which injustices are named in classrooms and which are ignored. They observe which victims are centred in teaching, mental health campaigns, and safeguarding policies, and which are omitted entirely. This is not a peripheral issue. It is a formative lesson in moral development.

Psychological research consistently shows that children's moral reasoning is shaped not just by abstract rules, but by their observations of adult behaviour and institutional values (Carlo et al., 2018; Wainryb & Recchia, 2012). In my own work, children spoke about fairness as intervening when someone is excluded, and kindness as helping others even when it is difficult. They described defending others as an ethical action, especially when power dynamics made it risky (Pervez & Galea, 2024). These are not simplistic accounts. They reveal a nuanced moral agency grounded in relational justice, responsibility, and emotional courage.

Yet the messages children receive from adults often contradict these values. In schools and psychological settings, we encourage young people to challenge bullying, stand against discrimination, and practise empathy. At the same time, they witness the silence surrounding Gaza, the obliteration of schools, hospitals, and homes; the deaths of thousands of children; the absence of grief or outrage in the institutions that claim to protect young lives. They hear adults speak of trauma-informed care while watching tens of thousands of traumatised children left unacknowledged.

The result is not just silence. It is a distortion of what empathy means. It becomes what Spivak (1988) called epistemic violence: the erasure not only of knowledge, but of who is permitted to be known, mourned, or protected. When we avoid naming atrocities, we do not shield children from harm, we distort their understanding of justice and reinforce the idea that some lives are less worthy of care.

A recent study exploring children's views on global inequality found that many young participants questioned why certain kinds of suffering prompted collective action, while other forms were ignored (Cowell et al., 2016). Their responses reflected what many adults may be unwilling to confront: institutional morality is not universal. It is shaped by race, geopolitics, and the discomfort of complicity.

The implications are serious. Avoiding Gaza in our classrooms, therapy spaces, and research does not neutralise the issue, it reinforces the disposability of some children. When empathy is taught without accountability, and values are proclaimed without application, we risk producing a form of professional ethics that is emotionally compelling but morally hollow.

If we ask children to show courage, compassion, and fairness, then we must be prepared to do the same. Our silence does not protect them. It teaches them who matters, and who does not.
From grief to accountability: What can Psychologists do?

Grief without accountability is not enough. It is possible to mourn injustice, even to name it, without disrupting the systems and silences that allow it to continue. For psychology, and for child-centred professions more broadly, the question now is not whether we care. It is whether we are willing to act.

The conditions in Gaza have obliterated the basic structures that child development depends on. A joint report by Save the Children (2024) describes Gaza's education system as having 'completely collapsed'. More than 625,000 children are now out of school, and entire generations face the long-term consequences of trauma, displacement, malnutrition, and injury. These outcomes are not natural consequences of conflict. They are the avoidable result of sustained and targeted state violence, and they demand a coordinated response from those who claim to protect children's wellbeing.

So what might that response look like?

1. Align professional ethics with political reality
Psychologists must insist that safeguarding principles and trauma-informed care apply universally, even, and especially, when the source of harm is politically charged. The BPS Code of Ethics commits us to social justice, respect, and integrity (BPS, 2021), yet those values risk being diluted when applied unevenly across global contexts.

The BPS's October 2023 statement rightly expressed concern for the psychological toll of the Israel-Gaza conflict and offered resources to support members working with those affected. These efforts are not insignificant. But the statement's neutral framing, guided by Charity Commission constraints, fails to convey the scale, structure, and enduring nature of the harm experienced by Palestinian children.

This is not about taking sides. It is about taking seriously the profession's commitment to child welfare, especially when children are unprotected, ungrieved, and structurally abandoned by the very systems meant to defend their rights. Our concern for all children must be credible. That means being willing to speak clearly about those who are being failed most severely. That is not a departure from psychological ethics, it is their most necessary expression.

2. Centre war-affected children in research and practice
Psychological research on war-affected children too often treats trauma as an isolated outcome, detached from the political and structural conditions that produce and sustain it. While frameworks of resilience and recovery are valuable, they risk glossing over the lived realities of children surviving occupation, siege, or forced displacement. Scholars such as Veronese and Castiglioni (2013) have long argued for approaches that situate these experiences within broader histories of dispossession, resistance, and survival.

This lens is not only relevant to Gaza. In Sudan, Haiti, Yemen, Afghanistan, and other contexts, children continue to face catastrophic violence amid institutional collapse and international neglect. Yet Gaza stands apart in its combination of real-time visibility, record-level child death tolls, and the absence of coordinated protection. Nowhere else have so many children died so quickly, with so little professional outcry from disciplines that claim to prioritise child wellbeing.

To centre war-affected children in research and practice demands more than clinical assessment. It requires ethical, community-embedded work that resists sanitised narratives and addresses the political conditions shaping children's lives. This is not about weighing one tragedy against another. It is about ensuring that complexity does not become an excuse for silence or neutrality.

3. Create space for critical dialogue in education and training
Avoiding Gaza in teaching and supervision does not protect students, it silences them. Psychologists working in academic and educational settings can incorporate critical pedagogy, support student-led discussion, and challenge the institutional discomfort that treats Palestine as unspeakable. As Tuck and Gorlewski (2015) argue, 'neutrality is not possible in the presence of injustice'.

4. Use your platform and networks
Not every psychologist works in international policy, but all of us can support campaigns for ceasefire, humanitarian access, and child protection. We can donate to trusted organisations such as Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP), the Palestine Children's Relief Fund (PCRF), and UNRWA. We can advocate for displaced Palestinian students to access temporary placements or remote learning. These are small actions, but they signal that children's lives matter, and that our ethics are not performative.

Psychology cannot end a war. But it can refuse to be complicit.
What will be remembered

In recent months, I've been called brave for speaking out, for naming what is happening to children in Gaza, and for challenging the silence of our professional communities. But telling the truth about child death and state violence should not require bravery. It should be the norm. The fact that it carries reputational risk, professional discomfort, or institutional unease tells us everything about how fragile our ethics have become.

Standing up for children should never feel like a career gamble. And yet, for many psychologists, educators, and researchers, it does. The moral cost of that silence is not only borne by those of us who feel it; it is borne by the children who are erased, the students who notice our omissions, and the next generation of professionals who will learn from our example. Our silence is not neutral. It is pedagogical. It teaches by omission.

But the burden of moral courage is not equally distributed. For those of us who are racialised, visibly Muslim, early-career, or precariously employed, the risks of speaking out are sharper and more enduring. Solidarity cannot mean expecting the most vulnerable to carry the heaviest load.

These are not abstract questions for me. They surface in day-to-day professional life: in students' whispered questions about whether they're allowed to speak; in meetings where Palestine is avoided; in the quiet discomfort of ethics review boards that pretend it isn't happening. For those of us who teach dignity, justice, and care as core values, the silence becomes unbearable. And morally incoherent.

In interviews with children, I've listened to young people describe what it means to be fair: to stand up for others, even when it's difficult. They didn't need ethical training to understand what solidarity looks like. They already knew. The question is: do we?

Psychology cannot claim to protect children if it is only willing to do so selectively. This is not about slogans. It is about the daily, often unseen ways we model our values: in what we publish, what we teach, and what we refuse to name. Palestinian children are not collateral. They are not too complex or too controversial to grieve. They are children, entitled to safety, dignity, and care.

When the war ends, and it will, the children will remember who saw them, who spoke for them, and who turned away. So will history. Our journals, our classrooms, and our professional statements will remain as evidence of what we chose to confront, and what we chose to ignore.

This is not a call to heroism. It is a call to integrity.Dr Aneeza Pervez is a socio-developmental psychologist whose research focuses on prosociality, belonging, and moral reasoning in childhood. Her work explores the intersection of psychology, morality, education, and social justice. She is a Teaching Associate in Psychology, University of Nottingham, and Betty Behrens Research Fellow Elect, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge. aneeza.pervez@nottingham.ac.uk
References

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Burman, E. (2020). Developments: Child, image, nation (2nd ed.). Routledge.

Butler, J. (2009). Frames of war: When is life grievable? Verso.

Carlo, G., White, R. M. B., Streit, C., Knight, G. P., & Zeiders, K. H. (2018). Longitudinal relations among parenting styles, prosocial behaviors, and academic outcomes in U.S. Mexican adolescents. Child Development, 89(2), 577–592.

Cowell, J. M., Lee, K., Malcolm-Smith, S., Selcuk, B., Zhou, X., & Decety, J. (2016). The development of generosity and moral cognition across five cultures. Developmental Science, 20(4), e12403.

Eidelson, R. (2024, October 23). The American Psychological Association is abandoning its commitment to human rights by refusing to speak out on Palestine. Mondoweiss. Retrieved from [Mondoweiss].

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Pervez, A., & Galea., E. (2024). Primary Schools: Spaces for children's social and emotional learning. Psychology of Education Review, 48(1), 68-76.

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Tuck, E., & Gorlewski, J. (2015). Racist ordering, settler colonialism, and edTPA: A participatory policy analysis. Educational Policy, 30(1), 197–217.

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Veronese, G., & Castiglioni, M. (2013). 'When the doors of Hell close': Dimensions of well-being and positive adjustment in a group of Palestinian children living amidst military and political violence. Childhood, 22(1).

Wainryb, C., & Recchia, H. E. (2012). Moral development in culture: Diversity, tolerance, and justice. In M. Killen & J. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (2nd ed., pp. 433–458). Psychology Press.

World Health Organization. (2024, November 6). WHO Director‑General's remarks at the Meeting of the United Nations Security Council on the situation of the health system in Gaza.


SOURCE: